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Chapter 1
Perception and Change in Update Logic
Jan van Eijck
Abstract Three key ways of updating one’s knowledge are (i) perception of states
of affairs, e.g., seeing with one’s own eyes that something is the case, (ii) recep-
tion of messages, e.g., being told that something is the case, and (iii) drawing new
conclusions from known facts. If one represents knowledge by means of Kripke
models, the implicit assumption is that drawing conclusions is immediate. This as-
sumption of logical omniscience is a useful abstraction. It leaves the distinction
between (i) and (ii) to be accounted for. In current versions of Update Logic (Dy-
namic Epistemic Logic, Logic of Communication and Change) perception and mes-
sage reception are not distinguished. This paper proposes an extension of Update
Logic that makes this distinction explicit. The logic deals with three kinds of up-
dates: announcements, changes of the world, and observations about the world in
the presence of witnesses. The resulting logic is shown to be complete by means of
a reduction to epistemic propositional dynamic logic by a well-known method.
1.1 The Riddle of the Caps
‘I see nobody on the road,’ said Alice. ‘I
only wish I had such eyes,’ the King re-
marked in a fretful tone. ‘To be able to see
Nobody! And at that distance too!’
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland.
We start with a variation on the so-called ‘wise men puzzle’ [24]. Imagine four
people standing in line, with three of them looking to the left, and one looking to
the right. These fellows, let us call them 1,2,3,4, each wear a cap. The leftmost guy,
agent number 1, can see no-one. Agent 2 can see agent 1. Agent 3 can see agents
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1 and 2. Agent 4, finally, who has his head turned in the other direction, can see
no-one. (I will assume in the story that these caps are worn by men, for ladies wear
hats.)
Assume it is common knowledge what the perceptive capabilities of the agents are.
So it is common knowledge that 1 can see no-one, that 2 can see 1 but no others,
that 3 can see 1 and 2 but no others, and that 4 can see no-one. In particular it is
commonly known that they all wear a cap, and that no-one can see the colour of his
own cap.
Now let there be a public announcement ‘there are two white caps and two black
caps’. After this, 3 knows the colour of his cap, for he can reason: I see two white
caps in front of me. There are only two white caps. So my own cap must be black.
If 3 publicly announces ‘I know the colour of my cap’, then as a result 2 gets to
know the colour of his cap as well. For 2 can reason as follows. If the guy behind
me knows the colour of his cap, then this means that he sees two caps of the same
colour in front of him. I see that 1 has a white cap, so my own cap must be white as
well.
Now suppose the initial situation is like this: the participants all face in the same
directions as before, but now 2 and 4 have changed caps.
In this case, obviously, 3 does not know the colour of his cap. But suppose 3 now
publicly announces ‘I do not know the colour of my cap’. The riddle of the caps is
this: how does this announcement reveal to 2 the colour of his cap? And for people
interested in epistemic model checking the riddle becomes: find a series of updates
corresponding to what goes on in this scenario, and such that in the model at the end
of the series of updates, the third agent knows the colour of his cap.
The ingredients that are used here are public announcements (‘There are two
white caps and two black caps’, ‘I know/do not know the colour of my cap’) and
common knowledge about the perceptive capabilities of the participants.
‘Common knowledge’ is a term coined by David Lewis in [23] (but see also [17]).
It is sometimes called ‘mutual knowledge’ ([29, 9, 10]), and it is essentially different
from general knowledge. If a group of people get separate messages that there will
be dinner party on Thursday, this generates general knowledge: we all know that
there is a dinner, but I do not know that you know there is a dinner, you do not know
that I know that there is a dinner, . . . If, instead, we all get the same email about
the dinner, and we see that we are all on the addressee list, this generates common
knowledge.
A similarity relation on a set of worlds W is an equivalence relation on W. Given
individual similarity relations ∼i for a i ∈ I, where I is a group of agents, I-common
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knowledge has the similarity relation given by:⋃
i∈I
∼i
∗ .
The semantics of common knowledge is expressed in terms of a fixpoint operation,
so it seems natural to assume that common knowledge is something that emerges
in the limit of a series of steps of knowledge aggregation, that it is some idealised
version of what happens when we acquire knowledge about knowledge in real life.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Common knowledge is ubiquitous, and it
comes about in a single step, in one of the following ways:
• by public announcement [27];
• by common witnessing of an event, when it is already common knowledge that
all can perceive the event [9];
• by variations and combinations of the above (’indirect co-presence’, ‘cultural
co-presence’ [9]).
Since common knowledge emerges in no other ways than these (in particular, in
a distributed environment, where messages or observations can be missed by an
agent, common knowledge cannot emerge [19]), it would seem that creating com-
mon knowledge about perceptive abilities prepares the ground for creating common
knowledge about perceived events.
The philosophical literature on perception — in particular the problems caused
by perceptual illusion or hallucination — is vast. See [1, 11, 13, 14, 28] for a small
sample. Rather than take all of this on board, I will draw some methodological
limitations from the outset, in that I will assume that perceptual experiences are
events rather than states (not all that is known in some state is perceived in that
state), and that these events lead to true knowledge: no deception resulting in illusion
takes place. The first of these is uncontroversial. It merely states that there is more
to knowledge than perception. The second assumption is more questionable, but it
has the considerable merit that it allows us to sidestep puzzles about hallucination.
Since the limitation to accurate perception can easily be lifted in an extension of the
logic that I will propose below, I feel there is no harm in these assumptions.
As one of my reviewers reminded me, accuracy of perception does not always
lead to knowledge: one can still misjudge what one accurately perceives. Indeed, the
link between perception and knowledge is rather involved, and perceptual evidence
cannot always serve as a basis for knowledge, as was pointed out by Gettier in [18].
Also, clearly, it is possible in certain cases to know p without perceiving p: we
might have learnt p by being told. If one of my colleague has a headache then she
can directly perceive this, but I cannot. Still, I will know about it as soon as she
tells me. In any case, I will assume that there is a sense of ‘perceiving p’ in which
perceiving p is sufficient for knowing p.
Analyzing the example puzzle with this in mind, can we see what is the nature of
the common knowledge about perceptive abilities that is needed? Focussing on the
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example, it seems that the following should somehow become common knowledge
between agents two and three:
• that the second person can see the first,
• that the third person can see the first and the second.
Common knowledge between sets of agents of these facts should be expressible in
the language. Moreover, updates that make these facts common knowledge should
also be expressible. It is therefore reasonable to start out with a logic of public
announcement and common knowledge.
Assume a set of agents N and a set of propositions P. Letting i range over N and
p over P, we define our basic epistemic language as:
φ ::= > | p | ¬φ | φ1∧φ2 | [α]φ | [!φ1]φ2
α ::= i |?φ | α1∪α2 | α1;α2| α∗,
Assume the usual abbreviations. In particular, φ1∨φ2 is shorthand for ¬(¬φ1∧¬φ2),
φ1 → φ2 for ¬(φ1 ∧¬φ2), 〈α〉φ for ¬[α]¬φ. Finally, [i]φ is abbreviated as Kiφ, and
[(∪i∈I i)∗]φ as Cφ.
This language is interpreted in the usual multimodal Kripke models (or labeled
transition systems). Such a model M is a triple (W,R,V) where W is a nonempty set
of worlds, R : N →P(W2) assigns a similarity relation ∼i to each agent i ∈ N, and
V : W → 2(P) assigns a valuation to each world w ∈W.
If M is given, we refer to its worlds component as WM , its relational component
as RM , and its valuation component as VM . Let M be given, and let w ∈WM . Then
the truth definition is given by:
M |=w > always
M |=w p :≡ p ∈ VM(w)
M |=w ¬φ :≡ not M |=w φ
M |=w φ1∧φ2 :≡ M |=w φ1 and M |=w φ2
M |=w [α]φ :≡ for all w′ with w α→ w′ M |=w′ φ
M |=w [!φ1]φ2 :≡ if M |=w φ1 then M  φ1 |=w φ2,
where M  φ1 is given by WMφ1 = {w ∈WM | M |=w φ1},
where VMφ1 is the restriction of VM to WMφ1 ,
and where RMφ1 is the restriction of RM to WMφ1 .
In this definition,
α→ is given by:
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w
i→ w′ :≡ wRM(i)w′
w
?φ→ w′ :≡ w = w′ and M |=w φ
w
α1;α2→ w′ :≡ ∃w′′ with w α1→ w′′ and w′′ α2→ w′
w
α1∪α2→ w′ :≡ w α1→ w′ or w α2→ w′
w
α∗→ w′ :≡ ∃w1, . . . ,wn with w = w1,w′ = wn,wi α→ wi+1
for 1 ≤ i < n.
We use [[φ]]M for {w ∈WM | M |=w φ}.
The logic presented here is in fact the public announcement restriction of the
format of ‘Logics of Communication and Change’ or LCC [7], which is in turn a
version of BMS style update logic [3].
Using bi for ‘the cap of the i-th guy (counting from left to right) is black’ and
Di(p) for Kip∨Ki¬p, we get that update with !Di(p) expresses the public announce-
ment: ‘i can distinguish p from ¬p’. Here are formal versions of the public an-
nouncements that make the relevant epistemic abilities common knowledge. Note
that we are not making a distinction yet between epistemic and perceptive abilities.
The ‘seeing’ in the paraphrases below is just a metaphor for knowing. ‘The first guy
cannot see the colour of any hat’ is rendered by (1.1):
¬D1(b1)∧¬D1(b2)∧¬D1(b3)∧¬D1(b4). (1.1)
‘The second guy can see the colour of cap 1, but not the colours of caps 2,3,4’ is
formalised by (1.2):
D2(b1)∧¬D2(b2)∧¬D2(b3)∧¬D2(b4). (1.2)
Formula (1.3) expresses ‘The third guy can see the colours of caps 1,2, but not the
colours of caps 3,4’:
D3(b1)∧D3(b2)∧¬D3(b3)∧¬D3(b4). (1.3)
Finally, ‘The fourth guy cannot see the colour of any hat’ is rendered by (1.4):
¬D4(b1)∧¬D4(b2)∧¬D4(b3)∧¬D4(b4). (1.4)
In the semantics above, we have given a semantics of knowledge, not perception.
One possible way to go in order to incorporate perception would be to extend each
∼i knowledge relation to an ≈i perception relation, add an operation for individual
perception, say ıˆ, stipulate that ıˆ is interpreted by ≈i, and impose suitable conditions
on the relations, in particular ∼i⊆≈i. An example would look like this (solid lines
for knowledge, dotted lines for perception without knowledge; the convention is
that the ≈ relation is given as the transitive closure of the union of the solid and the
dotted lines; the four possibilities that the agent considers are bb, bw, wb and ww –
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two black caps, a black cap in front and a white cap in second place, a white cap in
front and a black cap in second place, and two white caps):
0 : bb 1 : bw
2 : wb 3 : ww
Here and henceforth, we use shading to single out the actual world, and we leave
out reflexive links. So the model pictures a situation where bb is the case, where
the subject knows that ww is ruled out, while this knowledge is not backed up by
perception. As far as the subject can perceive, all of bb, bw, wb and ww are possible.
The difficulty with this approach is that it is an attempt to accommodate percep-
tion as part of the statics of what goes on. Rather than going this way, we will model
observations as actions that change epistemic models. This is in line with the gen-
eral approach of update logic; compare also the remark made in [5] that epistemic
update logic is already a logic of observations.
Given that perception is always perception of phenomena in a fleeting world,
it is very natural to view perceptions as actions. What is eternal and unchanging
cannot be perceived. To be perceivable is always the hallmark of being part of the
world of phenomena, the world described by ‘esse est percipi’. Perception is simply
change in the world that gets noticed, where the noticing may either be simultane-
ous with the change or may take place after the change. Given this, the distinction
between knowledge and perception reveals itself when the world itself changes. If
the changes in the world go unnoticed, knowledge may be lost. If the changes in
the world get noticed, we can say that change is perceived, and as a consequence
knowledge gets updated. The next sections will make clear what is meant by this.
1.2 Publicly Observable Change in the World
To flesh out the connection between perception and change, what is needed is an
account of effective abilities and perceptive abilities:
• Which changes can be observed by which agents?
• Which agents are aware of the perceptive abilities of which other agents?
• Which perceptive abilities are common knowledge?
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Systematic frameworks for answering these questions bring in the aspect of per-
spective in a natural way.
There is an important distinction between individual awareness and common
knowledge. Consider the caps example again. Imagine that the four guys with the
caps are standing in line again, or rather, that someone has put them in line with
their eyes closed. Now the first (leftmost) guy opens his eyes, and realises: ‘I am in
a position where I see nobody’. Next, the second guy opens his eyes, and realises: ‘I
am in a position where I can see person 1 in front of me’. Then, the third guy opens
his eyes, and realises: ‘I am in a position where I can see person 1 and person 2 in
front of me’. Finally, the fourth guy opens his eyes, and realises: ‘I am in a position
where I see nobody.’ Unless they all publicly announce their perception capabilities,
the ‘reasoning about knowledge and ignorance’ scenario of the example never gets
off the ground.
Suppose the world changes from
to
That is: the caps of the second and third guy are exchanged.
Before we indicate how to model all this in our logic, we take one intermediate
step, by discussing publicly observable change. For this, we add bindings (single
substitutions). Substitutions (finite sets of bindings) as a mechanism for modelling
actual change were first explored in [15], and subsequently adopted in [7], and later
in [22].
If P is the set of basic propositions, and LP is a language over P, then an LP-
binding is a pair (p,φ), where p ∈ P and φ ∈ LP. We will write binding (p,φ) as
p 7→ φ.
If M = (W,V,R) is an epistemic model and p 7→ φ is an LP binding, then V p7→φ
is the valuation that is like V for all q different from p, and has V p7→φ(p) = [[φ]]M .
In other words, V p7→φ assigns to p the set of worlds w in which φ is true. For M =
(W,V,R), call Mp7→φ the model given by (W,V p7→φ,R). The model Mp7→φ is the result
of updating M with a publicly observable change of p to φ.
Now we can handle publicly perceived change as follows. Suppose it is common
knowledge that an agent i can epistemically discriminate between p and ¬p. This
means that formula (1.5) holds:
CDip. (1.5)
Suppose the facts of the world change: the truth value of p gets flipped, and this
change is observable by all. This means the following substitution is applied:
p 7→ ¬p.
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If it was commonly known before the substitution that Dip, then, since the change
was publicly observable, afterwards this same fact will still be common knowledge.
In other words, principle (1.6) holds:
CDip→ [p 7→ ¬p]CDip. (1.6)
And if it is commonly known before the substitution that Kip, then it will be com-
monly know after the substitution that Ki¬p:
CKip→ [p 7→ ¬p]CKi¬p. (1.7)
This illustrates the creation of common knowledge without public announcement.
More precisely, this is an example of creation of common knowledge by means of
co-presence.
The example illustrates one of the mechanisms behind the creation of common
knowledge by co-presence: publicly perceived change in a situation where there is
common knowledge about epistemic ability.
The simplest way to ensure that adding a change operator to an epistemic logic
does not have the effect that knowledge degenerates into mere belief is to make all
changes public changes. The public change p 7→ ⊥ changes the truth value of p to
false everywhere in the model, so that ¬p becomes common knowledge.
1.3 Perceptive Ability and Perspective Shifts
Notice that the assumption that all change is publicly observable does not quite fit
our example: if the cap of the third guy changes colour, nobody can see this. What
we need to model this kind of change is a way of keeping track of the agents that
are able to observe the change.
These perceptive abilities themselves may change too, for a perspective shift is
just another kind of change in the world.
Suppose that the discriminative abilities of the agents in the caps example are
common knowledge, and suppose the situation then changes: the third guy turns
around, and is now looking to the right. What this means is that the world changes
from
to
1 Perception and Change in Update Logic 9
Assume that nobody can see this. Then the effect is dramatic. Unless we assume
that the other guys knew all along that it was possible that agent 3 might turn around,
this already turns the model into a non-S5 model. For if the first guy gets a different
colour cap, then the second guy will still believe that the third guy can observe this,
and so agent 2 draws the wrong conclusions.
It follows that to prevent ‘knowledge degeneration’, in a system of knowledge
and perception, loss of perceptive ability due to perspective shifts must either be
made common knowledge, or the perspective shifts must be handled in such a way
that everyone takes it at as conceivable that they occur.
Our modelling right now is not strong enough to capture this. What is needed is
a new way to interpret change operations, a way that takes the perceptive abilities
of the agents into account.
In a logic of perception we want to be able to distinguish between agents that
can observe certain changes and agents that cannot. If we still want to ensure that
updates with such partly perceived changes preserve S5 (do not change knowledge
into mere belief), then we need a subtle definition for updates that change facts, by
including information about who can observe the change.
To account for the facts that not all change is immediately perceived and that
changes can only be perceived by agents who are in the position to perceive them,
we will separate the changes from the observations about what has changed.
What we need in fact is a separation between (unobserved) change in the world
and the acts of perception witnessing the change. Before we can go into details, we
must briefly discuss a philosophical problem: how can one possibly maintain true
knowledge of a fleeting world in which things are bound to happen of which one is
not aware? The solution to this cannot be to model the infinity of ways in which the
world might change, and update with that. Our representations are finite, anyway,
as we are focussing on what a finite number of agents know about a finite number
of elementary facts. How does one model that fact p changes without the agents
being aware of the result of the change? We will model this as an action (the change
that really happens) that is indistinguishable from the trivial action (where nothing
happens). Suppose p changes to false, but no agent is aware of this change. Then the
result will be a model where for every ‘old’ situation there now is a pair of ‘new’
situations, such that no agent can see the difference between the members of the
pairs, and with the members of the pairs looking exactly the same, except for the
possible difference that in one member of the pair p is false.
Suppose I locked the front door. Immediately after I locked it I know it is locked.
But as soon as I turn my back, a change in the world might occur, and I know this,
for I know there are others with keys to the door. Someone else with a key might
unlock the door, and as soon as this actually happens, I actually lose my initial
knowledge. This is an example where change in the world of which I am not even
aware changes my state of knowledge. The way we cope with these situations in
real life is by taking into account that certain changes might occur. That’s why I am
not surprised if I find the door unlocked some time after I locked it.
In this paper I will assume that agents adapt to a changing world by being aware
of the areas where knowledge may get lost. Specifically, what agents do is “not
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rule out what actually happens” (always a wise strategy in life). In the action model
Ap7→φ for unobserved change p 7→ φ, all agents consider the change possible. The
action model looks as follows (note that reflexive arrows are not drawn):
Ap7→φ : 0 : > : p 7→ φ 1 : >
N
The action model has two states, 0 and 1, of which 0 is actual (indicated by the
grey shading). The actual action has no precondition (or: its precondition equals >),
and changes the value of p to φ. However, the agents do not observe this immedi-
ately, for they confuse this action with > (the action where nothing happens).
This was the action model for unobserved change. Next, we turn to the power of
perception. We will represent a perception or observation of φ by agent i, witnessed
by group of agents G, as (i,φ,G), where it is assumed that i ∈G (agents are aware of
their own perceptive abilities). Agents in G different from i do not themselves make
the distinction between φ and ¬φ, but they are aware that i makes that distinction.
We will use Ppi to express that p ∈ P(i), i.e., that agent i can perceive p. Let
voc(φ) be the vocabulary (set of proposition letters) of φ. Then a perception of φ
by i presupposes that the formula
∧
p∈voc(φ)P
p
i is true. Abbreviate this as P
voc(φ)
i . We
will use this formula as as a precondition of the actual perception.
An action model for perception (i,φ,G) takes the following shape:
A(i,φ,G) :
0 : Pvoc(φ)i ∧φ 1 : Pvoc(φ)i ∧¬φ
2 : >
{i}
G G
The actual observation can be either φ or ¬φ (both actions are actual in the action
model, indicated by the grey shading), and since it is i who is making this observa-
tion, other agents cannot distinguish between these two actions, for otherwise they
too would have learned whether φ is true. But the witnesses learn that i now can
distinguish the φ worlds (including the real world) from the ¬φ worlds. The agents
that have not witnessed the observation cannot distinguish this from the event where
nothing happens. This is given by the G links to the > event 2.
To see the effect of this, picture a situation where there are three agents i, j,k, and
a true fact p that is known to i, j but not to k:
M0 : 0 : p 1 : p
k
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Assume that k has the power to observe p, and that a perception by k of the value
of p takes place, witnessed by i but not by j. Then this action has the following
form:
0 : Ppk ∧ p 1 : Ppk ∧¬p
2 : >
i, j
j j
The effect of the update of M0 with this act of perception is the following:
0,0 : p
0,1 : p
1,1 : p
1,2 : p
j j
k
After renaming:
0 : p
1 : p
2 : p
3 : p
j j
k
The result of the act of observation is that j, the agent who failed to witness the
observation, no longer knows whether k knows about p or not.
Now let us play a different scenario. Assume that j has the power to observe the
value of p, and that j actually observes the value of p, witnessed by k. The update
model for ( j, p, { j,k}), i.e., for the perception of the value of p by j, witnessed by k,
but not i, has the form:
0 : Ppj ∧ p 1 : Ppj ∧¬p
2 : >
i,k
i i
The result of the update of M0 with this act of perception is the following model:
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0,0 : p 1,1 : p
0,2 : p 1,2 : p
i i
k
k
M1, after renaming:
(modulo bisimulation)
0 : p 1 : p
k
Perceptions of known facts change nothing, except when a witness of the perception
does not yet know that the perceiver knows already. For an example of how a per-
ception of a known fact can change a model, consider the initial model where both
j and k are ignorant about p:
M0′ : 0 : p 1 : p
j,k
If we update this with the update model for ( j, p, { j,k}), we get M1 back. Note that
the act of perception does not have as a result that j learns p, for j knew p already.
The effect is in the witnessing of the perception by k but not i. In M0, k does not
know p, but k does know that j can distinguish the p from the non-p situations. In
other words, k has learned that j knows whether p, because k was a witness of the
perception event.
Next, assume that the world changes, and p is made false everywhere. The action
model for this is the following:
0 : p 7→ ⊥ 1 : >
N
The result of making p false everywhere in model M0, publicly visible to all,
would be a model with a single world where p is false, for everyone would know
that p is false.
But the result of updating M0 with the action model Ap7→⊥ is more complicated.
It is the following new epistemic model (call it M2):
0,0 : p
0,1 : p
1,0 : p
1,1 : p
i, j,k i, j,k
k
k
M2, modulo bisimulation: 0 : p
1 : p
2 : pi, j,k
k
k
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The knowledge of i, j about p has disappeared: i, j no longer know whether p is
true or not. And indeed, the knowledge of k that i, j can distinguish p from ¬p has
disappeared as well.
Now suppose j makes a new observation. This time j observes the value of p,
witnessed by k. This observation is called ( j, p, { j,k}). Its action model looks like
this:
0 : Ppj ∧ p 1 : Ppj ∧¬p
2 : >
i,k
i i
The result of updating M2 with this new observation looks rather complicated.
Modulo bisimulation, it has 6 worlds 0, . . . ,5, with p true in {4,5} and false in the
other worlds:
0 : p
1 : p
4 : p
5 : p
2 : p
3 : p
ii i
k i,k
k i, j,k
Such models are a bit hard to construct by hand, but they can easily be found by
using an epistemic model checker [16].
Observations that are witnessed by all are better behaved. The action model for
( j, p, {i, j,k}), where {i, j,k} equals the set of all agents, is given by:
0 : Ppi ∧ p 1 : Ppi ∧¬p
i,k
Update of M2 with this observation gives:
p p
k
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To construct an action model for the combination of a change and an act of per-
ception directly after the change, we need a bit of Hoare style correctness reasoning
[21]. A Hoare triple for postcondition Ppi ∧ p after change p 7→ φ looks as follows:
{Pvoc(φ)i ∧φ} p 7→ φ {Ppi ∧ p}.
This expresses that φ is the weakest precondition for making p true after the assign-
ment p 7→ φ, and that the weakest precondition for being able to perceive p after the
assignment is: being able to perceive every proposition letter in the vocabulary of φ.
Note that it is not assumed that i perceives this change. But the Hoare triple can be
used to construct the action model for change of p immediately perceived by i.
Similarly, we have:
{Pvoc(φ)i ∧¬φ} p 7→ φ {Ppi ∧¬p}.
The weakest precondition for making p false after assignment p 7→ φ is ¬φ, while the
weakest precondition that making p observable by i after the assignment is Pvoc(φ)i .
Combining the models for unnoticed change and perception with witnesses, we
can construct an action model for perceived change. The action model for perceived
change (i, p, p 7→ φ,G) (perception by i of p after a change in p has taken place in
the model, with G as witnesses of the act of perception) takes the following shape:
A(i,p,p7→φ,G) :
0 : Pvoc(φ)i ∧φ, p 7→ φ 1 : Pvoc(φ)i ∧¬φ, p 7→ φ
2 : >
{i}
G G
As an example of the effect of updating with this, here is the updating result of
model M0 with A(i,p,p7→y,{i, j}):
0 : p 1 : p
k
Notice that the effect is not different from that of A( j,p,p7→y,{i, j}), for the action
models for these two actions boil down to the same thing:
A(i,p,p7→⊥,G) : 0 : >, p 7→ ⊥ 1 : >k
This is the kind of perceived change that goes on in the swapping caps example
that we started with. If the second guy in the row gets his white cap replaced by
a black cap, then this change is noticed by the third guy. This is an example of an
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application of the perceived change action model A(3,b2,b2 7→>,{3}). The change that
takes place concerns variable b2 representing the blackness of the cap of the second
guy, and agent 3 is the only one witnessing the change.
It should be clear how the present framework can be extended with perspec-
tive changes. A perspective change is nothing but a change in the function P. Such
changes can themselves be modelled by means of bindings P(i) 7→ Q with Q ⊆ P.
The model-changing effect of such an operation is that the P function of the model
gets modified. Again, there are various versions of this that preserve the S5 prop-
erties of models, with the two extremes being (i) perspective changes witnessed by
all, and (ii) unobserved perspective changes. We settle for the first in our logic of
the next section, but the treatment of the second is similar.
A perspective change witnessed by all can be represented by an action model as
follows:
AP(i) 7→Q >,P(i) 7→ Q
To handle the effect of this, we assume that every Kripke model has an associated P
function, with type P : N → 2(P). The model change that AP(i)7→Q brings about is a
map from models M to models MP(i)7→Q, where MP(i)7→Q is the result of modifying
the P function of M to P′, where P′ is given by: P′(i) = Q, and P′( j) = P( j) for j
different from i.
Common perception of change can be represented as change immediately fol-
lowed by observation witnessed by others. Common perception by i and j of a
change in p can get modelled as the following sequence of updates:
(p 7→ φ), (i, p, {i, j}, ( j, p, {i, j}).
The logic we are about to present accurately models how common perception of
change can create common knowledge.
A related issue is to explain how common knowledge about limitations to per-
ception can create common knowledge. If we can all see that a person is blind, then
her resulting lack of perception of change can become common knowledge (among
all who see that she is blind). In the present framework a change of affairs where i
cannot perceive p anymore is modelled as Ppi 7→ ⊥. In a framework where some per-
ceptive abilities are unperceived, an update with !¬Ppi , i.e. a public announcement
that i cannot perceive p, would be needed to make this change visible to all.
Our modelling assumes that perceptive abilities are always common knowledge.
If one wants to drop that assumption, to allow for (partially) unobserved perspective
shifts, one needs a separate P function for every world in a model. We leave the
details of this to the reader.
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1.4 A Logic of Change and Perception
Summing up, what do we need to develop a logic of perception and perceived
change?
Here is a language that allows for public announcements, for unperceived changes,
and for observations on those changes made by agents. This is just an example of a
possible set-up: we fix a particular set of action operators, suitable for the issues we
want to deal with, and we develop its logic.
φ ::= > | p | Ppi | ¬φ | φ1∧φ2 || [α]φ | [!φ1]φ2 | [β]φ | [γ]φ | [δ]φ
α ::= i |?φ | α1∪α2 | α1;α2 | α∗
β ::= (P(i) 7→ Q) where Q ⊆ P
γ ::= (p 7→ φ)
δ ::= (i,φ,G) where i ∈G ⊆ N
The new elements are basic propositions of the form Ppi , expressing that i has
the power to observe or perceive (changes in) p, and the modal operators β for
perspective shifts witnessed by all, γ for unobserved change and δ for an observation
by an agent witnessed by a group. Again, abbreviate as usual.
To interpret the language, we need to extend epistemic models with a function
P, as sketched above. If M is an epistemic model, PM is its P function. The truth
conditions for the new modal constructs were all given above. Note that we do not
require that Ppi implies Kip∨Ki¬p, for we wish to allow for the possibility that an
unperceived change of p has occurred that i has not yet observed.
The logic of perception and change has the same expressive power as Epistemic
PDL (for a proof that PDL is in EXPTIME, see, e.g., [20]). This can be seen by
performing a reduction in two stages:
• Translate into LCC, by replacing the β, γ and δ operators by the corresponding
LCC action models. Using ◦ for the translation operation, key clauses clauses
are: ([β]φ)◦ equals [Aβ]φ◦, ([γ]φ)◦ equals [Aγ,0]φ◦, and ([δ]φ)◦ equals [Aδ,0]φ◦,
where Aγ is the action model for unobserved change γ, and 0 is the actual action
of that action model, and where Aδ is the action model for observation δ, and 0 is
the actual action of that action model. (Translate [!φ1]φ2 as [A!φ1 ]φ2, where A!φ1
is the action model for public announcement.)
• Reduce the resulting fragment of LCC to PDL, using the approach of [7]. See
below.
For the reduction clauses for public announcements we refer to the literature [7].
A key clause in the reduction clauses for perspective shifts is: [APi 7→Q]P
p
i := > if
p ∈ Q, and ⊥ otherwise.
We will give the reduction clauses for unobserved change in detail. Consider the
action model for this as a finite automaton:
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0 : p 7→ φ 1 : >N N
N
N
Define functions T p7→φ00 ,T
p7→φ
01 ,T
p7→φ
11 ,T
p7→φ
10 on the set of regular epistemic expres-
sions, where T p 7→φi j (α) describes the joint effect of a step-by-step parallel transition
through the action model and through α, starting in state i and ending in state j of
the action model. Abbreviating, p 7→ φ as γ, the definitions run as follows:
T γ00(i) := i,T
γ
01(i) := i, T
γ
11(i) := i,T
γ
10(i) := i
T γ00(?ψ) := ?([p 7→ φ]ψ)
T γ01(?ψ) := ?⊥
T γ11(?ψ) := ?ψ
T γ10(?ψ) := ?⊥.
Next, for composite epistemic relations:
T γ00(α1;α2) := (T
γ
00(α1);T
γ
00(α2))∪ (T γ01(α1);T γ10(α2))
T γ01(α1;α2) := (T
γ
00(α1);T
γ
01(α2))∪ (T γ01(α1);T γ11(α2))
T γ11(α1;α2) := (T
γ
11(α1);T
γ
11(α2))∪ (T γ10(α1);T γ01(α2))
T γ10(α1;α2) := (T
γ
10(α1);T
γ
00(α2))∪ (T γ11(α1);T γ10(α2))
T γ00(α1∪α2) := T γ00(α1)∪T γ00(α2)
T γ01(α1∪α2) := T γ01(α1)∪T γ01(α2)
T γ11(α1∪α2) := T γ11(α1)∪T γ11(α2)
T γ10(α1∪α2) := T γ10(α1)∪T γ10(α2)
For the final case, the reduction for expressions of the form α∗, we must bear in
mind that the regular languages are generated by the generic two-state automaton
with the same structure as the change action model, and with various choices for
start state and final state.
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0 1A C
B
D
The language for the automaton with start state 0 and final state 0 can be charac-
terised as:
A∗(BC∗DA∗)∗.
For the same automaton, with 0 as start state and 1 as final state, we get:
A∗BC∗(DA∗BC∗)∗.
For the automaton with 1 as start and as stop state:
C∗(DA∗BC∗)∗.
And finally, for the automaton with 1 as start state and 0 as stop state:
C∗DA∗(BC∗DA∗)∗.
Replacing A,B,C,D by T γ00, T
γ
01, T
γ
11 and T
γ
10, respectively, we get the following
recipe for transforming an epistemic expression of the form α∗:
T γ00(α
∗) := (T γ00(α))
∗; (T γ01(α); (T
γ
11(α))
∗;T γ10(α); (T
γ
00(α))
∗)∗.
T γ01(α
∗) := (T γ00(α))
∗;T γ01(α); (T
γ
11(α))
∗; (T γ10(α); (T
γ
00(α))
∗;T γ01(α); (T
γ
11(α))
∗)∗
T γ11(α
∗) := (T γ11(α))
∗; (T γ10(α); (T
γ
00(α))
∗;T γ01(α); (T
γ
11(α))
∗)∗
T γ10(α
∗) := (T γ11(α))
∗;T γ10(α); (T
γ
00(α))
∗; (T γ01(α); (T
γ
11(α))
∗;T γ10(α); (T
γ
00(α))
∗)∗
Reduction axioms for [γ][α]ψ now run as follows:
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[γ]ψ ↔ [Aγ,0]ψ
[Aγ,0]> ↔ >
[Aγ,1]> ↔ >
[Aγ,0]p ↔ φ
[Aγ,0]q ↔ q (q different from p)
[Aγ,1]q ↔ q
[Aγ,0]¬ψ ↔ ¬[Aγ,0]ψ
[Aγ,1]¬ψ ↔ ¬[Aγ,0]ψ
[Aγ,0](ψ1∧ψ2) ↔ [Aγ,0]ψ1∧ [Aγ,0]ψ2
[Aγ,1](ψ1∧ψ2) ↔ [Aγ,1]ψ1∧ [Aγ,1]ψ2
[Aγ,0][α]ψ ↔ [T γ00(α)][Aγ,0]ψ∧ [T γ01(α)][Aγ,1]ψ
[Aγ,1][α]ψ ↔ [T γ11(α)][Aγ,1]ψ∧ [T γ10(α)][Aγ,0]ψ
Next, we can perform the same trick for action models Aδ. Here, the action model
automaton is a bit more complicated:
0 1
2
But the procedure is the same. Only this time we need epistemic program transform-
ers T δ00, T
δ
01, T
δ
02, T
δ
10, T
δ
11, T
δ
12, T
δ
20, T
δ
21, T
δ
22. The basic reduction axiom for [δ]ψ
runs
[δ]ψ ↔ [Aδ,0]ψ∧ [Aδ,1]ψ
reflecting the fact that Aδ has two actual states 0 and 1. Assuming δ equals (i,φ,G),
the program transformer T δ02(a) will be defined as ?(P
voc(φi)∧φ);a if a <G, and ?⊥
otherwise. Rather than spell out further details we refer to the general description
given in [7].
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Reduction axioms + PDL axioms + S5 knowledge axioms for [i] now give a
complete axiomatisation.
Theorem 1.1. The logic of change and perception is complete.
Theorem 1.2. The logic of change and perception has the same expressive power
as epistemic PDL.
We briefly return to the motivating example: the puzzle of the wise men. Using
the vocabulary b1,b2,b3,b4, we can model the perceptive abilities as the function P
given by:
P(1) = ∅
P(2) = {b1}
P(3) = {b1,b2}
P(4) = ∅
This says that the first and fourth agent can observe the colour of no-one, the
second agent can observe the colour of the first agent, and the third agent can observe
the colour of the second agent.
The perceptive abilities are assumed to be common knowledge; indeed this as-
sumption is a crucial element in the solution of the puzzle. This means that all
observations that take place have the set of all agents as witnesses. Consider again
the first version of the puzzle.
Assume an initial situation with common knowledge of universal ignorance: a
model with 42 = 16 worlds, for all possible combinations of cap colours.
To get at the correct epistemic representation for the epistemic situation where
the epistemic exchange (‘I do not know my colour’, ‘I do know my colour now’)
can take place, we need two public observations plus one public announcement. The
formal version of ‘there are two white caps and two black caps’ is:
φ = (b1∧b2∧¬b3∧¬b4)∨ (¬b1∧¬b2∧b3∧b4)∨ (b1∧¬b2∧¬b3∧b4)
∨(¬b1∧b2∧b3∧¬b4)∨ (¬b1∧b2∧¬b3∧b4)∨ (b1∧¬b2∧b3∧¬b4).
The four updates we need are:
(2,¬b1, {1,2,3}), (3,¬b1, {1,2,3}), (3,¬b2, {1,2,3}), !φ.
After the first update, it is common knowledge that agent 2 has observed the colour
of the first cap. After the second and the third update, it is common knowledge that
agent 3 has observed the colours of the first and the second cap, and the fourth
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update is the public announcement “Two of the caps are black and the other two are
white”.
Note that the first update can also be represented as (2,b1, {1,2,3}), and that the
second update can also be represented as (3,b1, {1,2,3}). Also note that the pair of
updates (3,¬b1, {1,2,3}), (3,¬b2, {1,2,3}) is stronger than the single update (3,¬b1∧
¬b2, {1,2,3}).
In our logic the following statement will hold in the initial situation of common
knowledge of universal ignorance:
[(2,b1, {1,2,3})][(3,¬b1, {1,2,3})][(3,¬b2, {1,2,3})][!φ]K3b3.
Next assume that the caps of the second and the third agent get exchanged, but the
agents are unaware of this: they are not paying attention, or they have closed their
eyes. This is modelled by the following updates:
b2 7→ >,b3 7→ ⊥.
After updating with this, agent 3 has lost his knowledge:
[b2 7→ >][b3 7→ ⊥]¬K3b3.
The actual world has changed into:
The epistemic effect of the unobserved changes is that we are back at square one:
no agent knows anything anymore about who is wearing which hat.
So one gets from the initial model of the first example to the initial model for the
second example by means of unobserved change. The knowledge from the earlier
witnessed observations has got lost.
New observations can remedy this. In the new universal ignorance model the
following statements will hold:
[(2,b1, {1,2,3})][(3,¬b1, {1,2,3})][(3,b2, {1,2,3})][!φ]¬K3b3∧¬K3¬b3.
That is, after a witnessed observation by agent two that the cap of agent one is white
and witnessed observations by agent three that the hat of agent one is white and that
of agent two is black, and a public announcement that there are still two black caps
and two white caps, we get into a situation where the third agent does not know his
hat colour.
But when this gets publicly announced, the announcement of ignorance by the
third agent reveals to the second agent what is his cap colour:
[(2,b1, {1,2,3})][(3,¬b1, {1,2,3})][(3,b2, {1,2,3})]
[!φ][!(¬K3b3∧¬K3¬b3)]K2b2.
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Properties such as these can be (and have been) verified by means of epistemic
model checking.
1.5 Conclusion and Further Work
Related work in (dynamic) epistemic logic can be found in Balbiani, Gasquet and
Schwarzentruber [2], Pacuit and Parikh [25], and Parikh, Moss and Steinsvold [26].
But all this remains very close to the general frameworks of DEL and LCC. A more
difficult challenge would be to model limitations of perception. Any sophisticated
account of perceptive ability will at some point have to address the issue of mod-
elling minimum perceivable difference (MPD). This relation is hard to handle in an
epistemic framework, for it is not transitive. To tackle this, one need to get around
the ‘paradox of the heap.’ See [30] for an early attempt in this area. Bonnay and
Egre´ show in [8] how imprecise knowledge can be represented with non-transitive
non-euclidean K45 models. Exploring the connection between the present approach
and theirs is future work.
The proposal of the present paper already makes a distinction between actual
perception and capability of perception, and should be compared with the logic
of sensors of [12], while the connection with the logic of perceptibilia [4] is also
worth pursuing. It may be possible to represent uncertainty in perception in terms
of probabilities; this would give an obvious link to [6].
A more radically different approach to uncertainty or vagueness in perception is
taken in the paper by Dunin-Ke¸plicz and Szałas elsewhere in this volume, which is
phrased in terms of rough sets.
Finally, awareness of basic propositions allows for the modelling of communi-
cation channels in DEL: if i is aware that j can perceive changes in p, then p is
a communication channel between i and j. Establishing a communication channel
can now be done by means of KiP
p
j . If this is transmitted from i to j, then i can
henceforth communicate with j by changes in the value of p.
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